cadherin stability. That the emergence of p120 coincides with the first fully functional classical cadherin complex, and not with the a-and b-catenin associated roles in Dictyostelium, suggests that p120 was originally introduced to the other catenins through physical association with the cadherins. Thus, it is possible that the Dictyostelium and metazoan complexes behave quite similarly with respect to the ancient collaboration between a-and b-catenins, and differ primarily by the addition of p120 and its roles in modulating cadherin function. Regardless, this new perspective on a-catenin and the extent of mechanistic similarity between the Dictyostelium and metazoan systems will be of interest on multiple levels to cell and evolutionary biologists alike. Figure 1 ). After a brief delay, another array of objects was presented, but one object was changed to a different item. The task for the person or monkey was to touch the changed object. Accuracy in detecting the changed object depends on the number of objects in the initially presented display. The capacity of short-term visual working memory -the number of discrete memory slots -can be estimated from the functional change in accuracy with display size. Following the assumptions of a discrete-memory model [5] , Elmore et al. [4] estimated that monkey visual short-term working memory capacity is at most one item, whereas capacity for humans was estimated to be perhaps as large is three items.
Humans store a limited number of items in short-term working memory to perform subsequent operations. A newly described assessment of memory in rhesus monkeys suggests qualitative similarities and quantitative dissimilarities to humans.
Jonathon D. Crystal
The metaphor of the brain as a computer dominates our thinking about human cognition and memory [1] . The metaphor highlights the digital nature of modern computers and applies related features to the fascinating abilities that people have to remember information from the past when performing subsequent operations on that information. According to this perspective, human memory consists of discrete slots that store discrete pieces of information. How much can be remembered depends on the total number of slots available (overall capacity), the number of pieces of information arriving at any one time (selective attention), and the number of slots already filled with old information (memory load) [2, 3] . Because this classic perspective of cognitive science predates many modern discoveries about the brain, we might wonder about the viability of the hypothesis that the brain has discrete slots to store discrete pieces of information. As reported in this issue of Current Biology, Elmore et al. [4] have compared the memory capacity of humans and rhesus monkeys with results that raise serious questions about this perspective.
In the new study [4] , people or monkeys viewed several objects, for example, clip art icons, presented in an array ( Figure 1) . After a brief delay, another array of objects was presented, but one object was changed to a different item. The task for the person or monkey was to touch the changed object. Accuracy in detecting the changed object depends on the number of objects in the initially presented display. The capacity of short-term visual working memory -the number of discrete memory slots -can be estimated from the functional change in accuracy with display size. Following the assumptions of a discrete-memory model [5] , Elmore et al. [4] estimated that monkey visual short-term working memory capacity is at most one item, whereas capacity for humans was estimated to be perhaps as large is three items.
Is it possible that people remember only three items and monkeys remember only one item? The claim that monkeys remember only one item is particularly paradoxical given the observed competency of monkeys in reporting about lists of pictures or sounds as long as four items [6] . The potential underestimate of capacity may stem from the assumptions of discrete memory slots. Indeed, when a distributed, noisy memory representation (consistent with physiological properties of the brain [7] ) is assumed, the data suggest that visual short-term working memory in humans and monkeys is a continuous resource that is distributed among many objects [4] . Limitations in memory performance, according to this continuous-resource view [8, 9] , are a direct consequence of noise in the internal representation of each object rather than being due to a fixed capacity of discrete items.
It is remarkable that a fundamental discovery about the representation of information in humans comes from a paradox about memory in rhesus monkeys. Hence, it is valuable to reflect on the comparative origins of this discovery. The key ingredient in attempting to gain insight into human cognition from work on an animal model is the use of identical tactics -the same procedures, concepts, quantitative theories -for testing both species, as in the work of Elmore et al. [4] . By contrast, many studies of cognition in animals have used the same terminology [10] , but the procedures, concepts, and/or quantitative theories have sometimes been strikingly disconnected from human research. Although there is the appearance of comparability, the disconnect may limit the discovery of fundamental operating characteristics of memory, which ultimately may limit the ability to translate discoveries from animal models of memory to disorders of memory in people [11, 12] . Hence, one lesson to be learned from the paradox in the Elmore et al. [4] study is the power of identical tactics.
Another recent advance illustrates the renewed focus on identical tactics in animal and human memory. Human memory is often separately assessed using tests of recognition and recall: in recognition, the to-be-remembered material is presented amidst novel lures while you try to remember (a task that may be solved by detecting which items are familiar), whereas in recall, the to-be-remembered information is absent (which requires bringing the memory to mind through recollection). All tests of animal memory are arguably recognition tests (familiarity memory). Basile and Hampton [13] recently reported in this journal the first evidence that rhesus monkeys can recall information that was not present at the time of testing. In their demonstration, monkeys reproduced simple shapes from memory on a touchscreen, in a way that is analogous to a child's connect-the-dot game with a uniform grid of dots. They found that the memory performance of monkeys paralleled that of humans in other recall and recognition tests.
The theme of identical tactics has a broader lesson for efforts to model other types of memory from a comparative perspective. Episodic memory is memory for unique, personal past experiences that happened to you [14] and is profoundly impaired in Alzheimer's disease [15] . In the comparative study of episodic memory, progress has been made in modeling the content of episodic memories in animals [16, 17] ; however, these methods have not yet used identical tactics. To develop converging lines of evidence that animals have episodic memories [18, 19] , it will be critical to increase the mapping of methods, concepts, and quantitative measures. The use of identical tactics in studying animals and humans holds enormous potential to translate discoveries of biological properties of memory in animal preclinical models to the study of disorders of human memory. Hence, the benefit may be an increase in the ability to produce relief for people suffering from profound impairments in memory. Change-detection memory may potentially be used to study episodic memory [6, 20] , which would greatly enhance similarity of tactics in animal and human experiments. In a change-detection memory task, icon displays are presented sequentially, and the ability to successfully detect change is likely influenced by repeating icons from time to time, thereby promoting the development of proactive interference between an icon from a current study display and one from an old study display [6] . A significant challenge for a changedetection approach will be to implicate a role for recollection and rule out the use of familiarity-based memory processes. 
